Cyber security

Wicked Panda APT Adversary Simulation

This is a simulation of attack by the Wicked Panda group (APT-41) targeting U.S. state government networks the attack campaign was active between May 2021 and February 2022, in addition to attacks targeting Taiwanese media, the attack chain starts with the in-memory execution of MoonWalk backdoor.

Once the MoonWalk backdoor is successfully loaded by DodgeBox, the malware decrypts and reflectively loads two embedded plugins (C2 and Utility).

The C2 plugin uses a custom encrypted C2 protocol to communicate with the attacker-controlled Google Drive account. I relied on zscaler to figure out the details to make this simulation

This attack included several stages including DodgeBox, a reflective DLL loader written in C, showcases similarities to StealthVector in terms of concept but incorporates significant improvements in its implementation.

It offers various capabilities, including decrypting and loading embedded DLLs, conducting environment checks and bindings, and executing cleanup procedures.

What sets DodgeBox apart from other malware is its unique algorithms and techniques.

  1. Employs DLL sideloading as a means of executing DodgeBox. employs DLL sideloading as a means of executing DodgeBox. They utilize a legitimate executable (taskhost.exe).
  2. The malicious DLL, DodgeBox, serves as a loader and is responsible for decrypting a second stage payload from an encrypted DAT file (sbiedll.dat), The decrypted payload, MoonWalk functions as a backdoor.
  3. Data exfiltration: over GoogleDrive API C2 Channe, This integrates GoogleDrive API functionality to facilitate communication between the compromised system and the attacker-controlled server thereby potentially hiding the traffic within legitimate GoogleDrive communication.

The First Stage (DodgeBox DLL loader)

This payload detects sandbox environments by checking for the presence of the SbieDll module and halts execution if found. It dynamically resolves API functions using obfuscated hashes to evade detection.

The code allocates memory in the process using NtAllocateVirtualMemory, potentially for injecting or executing malicious code. It employs FNV-1a hashing to obscure strings like DLL and function names.

Additionally, it uses DLL sideloading to execute DodgeBox, leveraging a legitimate executable like taskhost.exe to bypass security mechanisms.

  1. Sandbox Detection

The SbieDll_Hook function attempts to detect a sandbox environment (e.g., Sandboxie) by checking for the SbieDll module using GetModuleHandle(L”SbieDll”).

If the module is detected, it triggers an infinite sleep (Sleep(INFINITE)) to prevent further execution, a common evasion tactic used by malware to avoid analysis in sandboxed environments.

  1. Triggering Core Logic

If the sandbox module is not detected, it proceeds to execute the core malicious functionality in the MalwareMain function.

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Varshini

Varshini is a Cyber Security expert in Threat Analysis, Vulnerability Assessment, and Research. Passionate about staying ahead of emerging Threats and Technologies.

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